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Abstract
In this paper a formal description of trustworthy real-time reactive components is given. Component templates are deﬁned
and components are deﬁned as instances of a template. A template consists of a structure part and a contract part. All
components of a template share the structural and contractual properties while differing in their architectural descriptions
and implementations. The behavior of a component is behavior of the architecture associated with the component and it
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1 Introduction
In this paper we determine safety and security as the two criteria of trustworthiness for
RTRS and propose a formal approach to develop a trustworthy system. The development
methodology is based on component technology. The goal is to formalize a trustworthy
component and deﬁne a composition that preserves the requirements of safety and security.
Reactive systems belong to the class of computer systems that maintain continuous
interaction with their environment through stimulus and response. The class of reactive
systems in which the reaction to a stimulus may be strictly regulated by timing constraints
is called real-time reactive systems (RTRS). This type of systems has become an essential
part of the technological infrastructure of modern societies. It is being used for a long time
in safety critical missions, many directly affecting the environment and lives of people.
Such systems are required to be trustworthy due to its complexity and the critical contexts
in which they operate.
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Trustworthiness is the system property that denotes the degree of user conﬁdence that
the system will behave as expected [10,23]. In order to trust the system, the trustworthiness
credentials of the system should be examined before granting the trust. The challenge in
building provably trustworthy RTRS lies in combining safety and security requirements.
Research in verifying safety and security properties have progressed in parallel, due to
the ﬁnding that safety and security can’t be formally speciﬁed and veriﬁed together in
any one formal method [18,27,16]. We suggest the use of component-based development
(CBD)[26] as a basis for a uniﬁed formal model for the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of
safety and security properties of RTRS.
CBD is the type of software engineering development in which systems are built by
constructing units, called components, that perform simple tasks, and assembling them
to create composite components that perform complex tasks. Some potential beneﬁts of
applying CBD for RTRS include complexity reduction, time and cost savings, predictable
behavior, and productivity increase [10].
In the literature, there is an inconsistency in deﬁning components between un-timed and
real-time component models. On the one hand, there is a common agreement [10,22,26]
that component speciﬁcation should include both structural and behavioral description.
Structural description includes, but not limited to, specifying interfaces, connectors, and
composition. These are central concepts in CBD. An interface deﬁnes access points to
the services provided/requested by components. A connector is a special component that
deﬁnes the communication between two components. Composition allows building sys-
tems by connecting existing components in such a way that preserves their essential prop-
erties. On the other hand, in current component-based models for real-time systems, a
component is modeled as timed automata [5], duration automata [15], extended ﬁnite-
state machine [12], and ﬁnite-state process [11]. Such modeling techniques focus only on
the behavioral aspect and makes no distinction between object-oriented and component-
based models. Other real-time component models [9] deﬁne ”ﬂat” components with re-
strictive execution model as opposed to hierarchical components found in general un-timed
component-based models [4,21]. This shows that there is no uniform speciﬁcation notation
yet for describing un-timed and timed systems. Moreover, all the component models pre-
sented focus mainly on safety and liveness properties and don’t provide a formal foundation
for the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of secure components.
We propose a component model that collectively addresses the requirements of RTRS
and credentials of trustworthiness. A central challenge in building trustworthy sys-
tems [20,23] using CBD method is composing trustworthy components so that the com-
posed component is trustworthy . The main contributions of this paper are (1) a deﬁnition
of the requirements of a component model for developing trustworthy RTRS, (2) a formal
deﬁnition for trustworthy hierarchical RTRS components, and (3) a compositional theory
for composing the structure and contract speciﬁcation of trustworthy components. To the
best of our knowledge there seems to be no published work that has combined safety and
security in a provably correct manner in the development of trustworthy systems.
2 Requirements of a Component Model for Trustworthy RTRS
In this section, we state the requirements of RTRS, elements of trustworthiness, and ele-
ments of a component-model. We discuss how CBD can be used to effectively implement
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the requirements of RTRS and trustworthiness. The stated requirements form the basis for
the formal deﬁnitions of our model that will be presented in subsequent sections.
2.1 Requirements of RTRS
Designing RTRS components is more complex than designing non-RTRS components.
There are four main requirements that must be satisﬁed by RTRS under all circum-
stances [10]:
1. Timeliness: The correct behavior of RTRS depends not only on performing the intended
functionality but also depends on the time at which certain functions ﬁnish. It is essential
that system reactions always satisfy both the functional requirements and the timeliness
requirements.
2. Simultaneous processing: In RTRS, many events can occur simultaneously. The behav-
ior of the RTRS is not correct if the system reacts to some stimuli and ignores others.
3. Predictability: For every stimulus there is precisely one kind of reaction. This makes the
behavior of RTRS predictable.
4. Dependability: When the environment of the RTRS requests a service from the system,
it trusts that the system will react as expected by it. The predicted reaction should satisfy
the functional and non-functional requirements expected by the environment. Depend-
ability is deﬁned as the ability to deliver trusted services [3]. In the literature [25], the
terms dependability and trustworthiness are used interchangeably.
2.2 Elements of trustworthiness
There is a general agreement [3,23,25] that trustworthiness involves achieving availabil-
ity, reliability, safety, and security. Below we discuss these elements and point out the
consequences of the misbehavior of RTRS in their absence.
1. Availability is the quality of operation in which there is no unforeseen or unannounced
disruption of service. A temporary outage of service may not cause big problems for
a non-RTRS. The required services can be requested at a later point of time when the
system becomes available. However, any service outage for RTRS will violate the re-
quirements of timeliness and may lead to catastrophic consequences.
2. Reliability is the quality of continuing to provide correct services [3]. A RTRS is ex-
pected to have a high degree of reliability due to the critical contexts it operates in.
3. Safety is the quality of the operational behavior of the system in which no system ac-
tion that may lead to catastrophic consequences will happen. Safety includes a set of
properties that describe the correct behavior of the system. Safety properties are system
speciﬁc. Failure to satisfy safety properties could directly affect the availability and reli-
ability of the system due to the incorrect behavior. Hence, ensuring safety properties is
very critical for RTRS.
4. Security denotes the acceptable quality of the system before, during, and after every
operation. Authorization to request (provide) services, integrity of information provided
to clients of components, and conﬁdentiality of stored and communicated information
are some of the important aspects in ensuring security of the system. Assuring integrity
of data within each component, and ensuring conﬁdentiality of data stores within each
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component are issues that we do not address in this paper. Ensuring the integrity of data
communicated by a component to its client is part of correctness issue. Enforcing that
only authorized clients request and receive services from a component is vital to ensure
conﬁdentiality. Authorization in the system is based on user identity [19,23]. A user
represents an entity, may be human or system component to whom services are provided
and on whose behalf services are requested. Security violations, which in our case is the
unauthorized usage of system resources, will directly affect the availability, reliability,
and safety of the system.
From the above discussion it can be concluded that safety and security are essential pre-
requisites for ensuring availability and reliability. Therefore we conclude that the essential
credentials for ensuring trustworthiness of RTRS are safety and security. This is the justiﬁ-
cation for focusing only on these two aspects in this paper.
2.3 Elements of a component model
This section is a brief introduction to the elements of a component model. Detailed formal
deﬁnitions are presented in Section 3. Figure 1 shows a component template composed
of a structure part and a contract part. The structure of a template is an abstract external
black-box view, called frame, and its internal hierarchical structure, called architecture.
The frame consists of the interface types, where each interface type is associated with a set
of services. A service may be parameterized with data types. An architecture is a collection
of connector types, an abstract view of the tie-ins between interface types. The contract part
of the template states the properties required of the system for which the structure is a blue
print.
A component is an instance of a component template. Every component instantiated
from a template has one instance of the structure part deﬁned for the template. The frame of
the component is a set of interfaces, where each interface belongs to exactly one interface
type in the template frame. An architecture instance corresponding to a component frame is
an instance of the architecture corresponding to the frame in the template, having as many
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instances of connector types as are required for linking the interfaces in the component. A
component’s contract constrains the communication pattern at its interfaces and is faithful
to the contract part in its template.
A component frame can contain multiple interfaces of an interface type. This enables a
RTRS component to interact in a similar way with several other components, receive/send
many interactions at the same time, and perform simultaneous processing. Through con-
tracts we can specify the requirements of timeliness, reactivity, safety, and security at dif-
ferent interfaces of the same type. At each interface of a component frame, stimuli and
reactions can be regulated, restricted and ﬁltered. Regulating reactions at an interface en-
sures timeliness, restricting reactions promotes safety, and ﬁltering services at interfaces
can protect the component from unauthorized use. By scrutinizing the nature of a stimulus
and the response to it at an interface, a request for service can be either authenticated or
denied. The data parameters carried by a response at an interface of the component frame
can be validated both for integrity and conﬁdentiality. Moreover, obligations associated
with responses can be veriﬁed at frame interfaces.
Due to space limitation we discuss only the structure and contract formal deﬁnitions
in this paper. In [2] we discuss the behavior speciﬁcation of a component, which can be
generated automatically from the structure and contract speciﬁcation.
3 Speciﬁcations of Trustworthy Components
In this section we discuss three issues. These are (1) basic deﬁnitions that lead to a formal
deﬁnition, (2) a formal deﬁnition of un-timed components, and (3) a formal deﬁnition of
RTRS components that exhibit safe and secure behavior.
3.1 Basic deﬁnitions
We use the template notation [21], although conceptually and semantically our deﬁnition
of frame and architecture are different.
• A component requests/provides a set of services. We assume a ﬁnite non-empty set of
services Σ, in which every service is either a stimulus or a response. A service cannot be
both a stimulus and a response for a component.
• An interface type is an enumerated type whose elements are services from Σ. An inter-
face is an instance of an interface type, it inherits the services listed in the type deﬁnition.
Two interface types P and Q are compatible if and only if for every service s : P there
exists exactly one service s : Q such that s and s are complementary. That is, in design-
ing component interaction both s and s will be assigned to occur simultaneously at com-
ponent interfaces of interacting components. We deﬁne the predicate Compatible(P,Q)
which is true if and only if P and Q are compatible.
• A frame is a black-box with a ﬁnite (non-empty) set of interface types, such that no two
pairs of interface types of the frame are compatible.
• A Connector type is a tuple (L,M), where L is a link speciﬁcation and M is a com-
munication style speciﬁcation. The link speciﬁcation L is a tuple (F1,P,F2,Q), where
P is an interface type of frame F1, Q is an interface type of frame F2 and (P,Q) are
compatible interface types. This abstraction allows us to deﬁne composition of frames.
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We use the notation P @ F1 ⊞Q @ F2, instead of tuple notation, to introduce a connector
type link. The communication style M speciﬁes the type of communication used by the
connector to deliver services. There are a number of common communication styles to
choose from [24]: procedure call, message passing, remote procedure calls, etc. This
paper focuses on the link speciﬁcation only.
• Aframe hasan associated architecture, an abstract implementation ofit. Ingeneral, more
than one architecture may correspond to a frame as different implementation versions. If
the speciﬁcation of the architecture of a frame is given by a program implementation then
the frame is primitive. A non-primitive component is a composite frame, which includes
two or more frames. The architecture speciﬁcation of a composite frame is a grey-box
view of the frame. It includes the black-box deﬁnitions of the constituent frames and a
speciﬁcation of connectors used to compose them.
• A template, also called component type, is a tuple CT = (F,A) where F is a frame
and A is an architecture of frame F. We use the notation CTF and CTA to respectively
denote the frame and architecture of the component type CT.
• A component is an instance of a component type. A component instance C of type CT =
(F,A) is the tuple C = (F′,A′), where F′, called component frame, has interfaces that
are instances of interface types in the deﬁnition of F, and A′, called the component
architecture, has connectors that correspond to the connector types in A. We use the
notation CF and CA to respectively denote the frame and architecture of the component
C. In general, if C is an instance of CT then CF is an instance of CTF, and CA is an
instance of CTA. The component frame CF can have one or more interfaces that are
instances of an interface type of CTF. The aggregation of all interface instances in CF,
hereafter called interfaces of the instantiated component C, provides a black-box view
of the component C. If p, an interface of CF, is an instance of the interface type P of
frame CTF, the interface p inherits all the services in the type deﬁnition of P. That is, in
the component C services that are inherited by p are either requests (stimulus) received
at p or provides sent out at p.
• A connector is an instance of a connector type. It implements the communication style
speciﬁed in the connector type. We use the symbol ⊲⊳ to denote the link part of a connec-
tor. As an example, a connector link of type P @ F1 ⊞ Q @ F2 is p @ f1 ⊲⊳ q @ f2, if f1
is an instance of F1, P is an interface type in F1, p is an instance of P, f2 is an instance
of F2, Q is an interface type in F2, and q is an instance of Q.
The template deﬁnition enables the dynamic conﬁguration of components at instantiation
time. This is because the frame deﬁnition consists only of interface types and the archi-
tecture deﬁnition consists only of connection types. When a component is instantiated,
multiple instances of each interface type and connection types can be created and linked
to create different versions of the frame and the architecture. Different notations are given
to the type deﬁnitions of: frame(CTF), interface(P), architecture(CTA), and connection
link(P @ F1 ⊞ Q @ F2) than those given to the instances of those entities: CF, p, CA, and
p @ f1 ⊲⊳ q @ f2 respectively. This enables the formal speciﬁcation of dynamic conﬁgura-
tion.
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3.2 Un-timed components - a formal deﬁnition
An un-timed component requests/provides services without being governed by time restric-
tions. In the rest of this section we simply refer to an un-timed component as component.
Services are modeled as events occurring at the interfaces ofa component frame. There-
fore, every element of Σ is considered an actual event. A service request (stimulus) is
an input event representing an information ﬂow from outside the component to the in-
side. On the other hand, a service provision is an output event representing an informa-
tion ﬂow from inside the component to the outside. Input and output events are external
events. Internal processing of services inside the component is done using internal events.
Therefore, Σ is divided into a set of input events Σinput, a set of output events Σoutput,
and a set of internal events Σinternal. Formally, Σ = Σinput ∪ Σoutput ∪ Σinternal and
Σinput ∩ Σoutput ∩ Σinternal = ∅. Service requests and responses may include informa-
tion carried by events. These information are modeled as data parameter values attached to
events. We assume a ﬁnite set of data parameters Λ, in which every data parameter can be
assigned to one or many events.
A component should be speciﬁed as a black-box entity to enable designers to reuse it
without knowledge of its internal structure [10]. From the basics explained in Section 3.1
it is clear that we need to formally specify a component type CT.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let CT be a primitive component type. The speciﬁcation of frame CTF is
a tuple < Π,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ >, where Π is a ﬁnite non-empty set of interface-types such that
∀P ∈ Π, ∀Q ∈ Π • ¬Compatible(P,Q), Σ is a ﬁnite set of events, Λ is a ﬁnite set of
data parameters, Ξ : Σ → PΛ is a function that associates with each event a set of data
parameters, and σ : Π → PΣ is a function that associates a ﬁnite non-empty subset of
external events to each interface-type such that ∀P,Q ∈ Π,σ(P) ∩ σ(Q) = ∅.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let CT be a composite component type. The speciﬁcation of CTF is the
speciﬁcation of its constituent frames, each speciﬁed as in Deﬁnition 3.1. Compatible inter-
face types of the frames are used to connect the frames and deﬁne connector types. Other
non-compatible interface types form the set of interface types of CTF. The speciﬁcation of
architecture type CTA is a collection of connector types, where each connector type link is
of the form P @ F1 ⊞ Q @ F2, where F1 and F2 are two frames in deﬁning CTF and the
interface type P of F1 is compatible with the interface type Q of F2.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A component frame CF is created from the template frame CTF by speci-
fying for each interface type P in CTF the number of interfaces (#P) of type P required
in CF. If #P = n, we let CP = {p1,...,pn} denote the interfaces created. A speciﬁcation
of CF is < ΠI,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ >, where ΠI =
 
P ∈ CTF CP. The σ function is extended to
interfaces: ∀p ∈ P •σ(p) = σ(P). A component architecture CA from the template archi-
tecture CTA is created by deﬁning n connectors in CA for each connector type in CTA if n
interfaces have been created in CF corresponding to the interface type(s) in the connector
type.
Example 3.4 Let CTF be a composite frame whose constituent frames are F1 =<
Π1,Σ1,Λ,Ξ1,σ1 >, and F2 =< Π2,Σ2,Λ,Ξ2,σ2 >, where Π1 = {X,Y }, Π2 =
{Z,W}, Σ1 = {e1,e2,e3}, Σ2 = {e1,e2,e3}, Λ = ∅, Ξ1(e1) = Ξ1(e2) = Ξ1(e3) =
Ξ2(e1) = Ξ2(e2) = Ξ2(e3) = ∅, σ1(X) = {e1}, σ1(Y ) = {e2,e3}, σ2(Z) = {e1},
σ2(W) = {e2,e3}. Interface types X and Z are compatible, as well as interface types Y
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and W are compatible. An architecture type CTA for CTF is deﬁned below:
X @ F1 ⊞ Z @ F2
Y @ F1 ⊞ W @ F2
Example 3.5 Let x1,x2 : X, y1 : Y , z1 : Z, and w1,w2 : W. Let F′
1 and F′
2 be instances
of F1 and F2 respectively. The speciﬁcation of the composite component frame is given
below:
F′
1 =< ΠI1,Σ1,Λ,Ξ1,σ1 >, F′
2 =< ΠI2,Σ2,Λ,Ξ2,σ2 >,
where ΠI1 = {x1,x2,y1}, and ΠI2 = {z1,w1,w2}, σ1(x1) = σ1(x2) = {e1},
σ1(y1) = {e2,e3}, σ2(z1) = {e1}, σ2(w1) = σ2(w2) = {e2,e3}.
Two possible instance architectures CA1 and CA2 of CTA, are given below:
CA1 CA2
x2 @ F′
1 ⊲⊳ z1 @ F′
2 x1 @ F′
1 ⊲⊳ z1 @ F′
2
y1 @ F′
1 ⊲⊳ w1 @ F′
2 y1 @ F′
1 ⊲⊳ w2 @ F′
2
the interfaces x1 and w2 are free. the interfaces x2 and w1 are free.
Free interfaces can be used to connect the component to other components.
By a component C we mean the pair (CF,CA). The architecture CA is an abstract
implementation of the component frame CF. The behavior of C is the implementation
behavior of CA, and is observed at the interfaces of CF. We deﬁne the behavior at an
interface p of CF as a set of sequences over σ(p). The behavior of component C is the
arbitrary interleaving of sequences at the interfaces of CF.
3.3 Timed reactive components (TRC)- a formal deﬁnition
A reactive component is a component that maintains continuous interaction with its en-
vironment through stimulus and response (reaction). A stimulus is an input event and a
response is either an output or an internal event. In a timed system, timing information is
associated with event occurrences. A timed reactive component (TRC) is a reactive com-
ponent whose responses are governed by constraints of the following two types: (1) time
constraints, and (2) data parameter constraints. First, a response e can be constrained to
happen, say at time te within a time bound [le,ue). That is, le ≤ te < ue. Second, a re-
sponse can be enabled or disabled using data parameter constraints. These constraints are
logical expressions that evaluate to boolean values based on the values of data parameters
carried by the stimulus. Hence, we extend the formal deﬁnition of the un-timed component
frame to include reactivity and a ﬁnite set of constraints.
Deﬁnition 3.6 The frame deﬁnition of a TRC is obtained by extending the frame deﬁnition
of un-timed system with the parameters Θ,Γ,Ω as deﬁned below:
Θ : Σinput → Σoutput ∪ Σinternal is a total function that associates a set of responses to
each stimulus,
Γ is a ﬁnite set of timing constraints for the events in Σ, where each time constraint Γ(s,r)
involves conjuncts of the form (t(r) − t(s)) ◦ n, where t(.) is the time function for event
occurrences, s ∈ Σ is a stimulus, r ∈ Σ, r ∈ Θ(s) is a response to s, ◦ ∈ {<,≤,=,≥,>},
and n : N, and
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Ω is a ﬁnite set of constraints for the data parameters associated with the events in Σ, where
each data constraint of an event s ∈ Σ is a predicate deﬁned over the values of the data
parameters associated with s. If s has n number of responses in Θ(s) than there must be n
number of mutually exclusive data constraints deﬁned over the data parameters of s. This
ensures that the responses of s are mutually exclusive. A TRC frame CTF is written as
< Π,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ,Θ,Γ,Ω >.
Deﬁnition 3.7 For a TRC component C with frame CF =< ΠI,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ,Θ,Γ,Ω > we
deﬁne the behavior at an interface p as a set S(p) of timed sequences, where each sequence
ω ∈ S(p) contains only stimulus and response events belonging to σ(p) ∪ Σinternal, and
satisﬁes the following conditions (safety requirements):
• [S1] for every stimulus s in ω, s ∈ σ(p), there exists exactly one response r ∈ Θ(s).
The stimulus s may occur at many different times in ω; let s[i] denote an occurrence of
s in ω, then for every s[i] there exists exactly one response r[i] where r[i] ∈ Θ(s),i :
N,i < number of events in ω. It is possible to have different responses for different
occurrences of the same stimulus (based on data constraints in Ω),
• [S2] t(r[i]) ≥ t(s[i]), where t(.) is the time function for event occurrences and r[i],s[i]
denote an occurrence of s and r in ω. Also, t(s[i]) > t(s[j]) ∧ t(r[i]) > t(r[j]),i,j :
N,i > j ∧ i,j < number of events in ω. This means that an event may occur at
difference times in the timed sequence where always the time of the later occurrence is
greater than the time of the former occurrence of the same event,
• [S3] for every stimulus s ∈ ω and response r ∈ Θ(s), t(r) conforms to Γ(s,r), and
• [S4] for every stimulus s ∈ ω and response r ∈ Θ(s), if there is a data constraint
deﬁned over the data parameters of s then the data constraint is satisﬁed. If there are
many data constraints deﬁned on the data parameters of s then one of them is satisﬁed.
Notice that [S1] assures predictability, [S2] and [S3] assure timeliness, and [S4] asserts that
safety requirements are satisﬁed.
Event names in the sequences of S(p) can be qualiﬁed by the name of the interface instance
p, from which the event originated.
Deﬁnition 3.8 The behavior of a reactive component is the arbitrary interleaving of the
behaviors at the interfaces of the component.
3.4 Secure-TRC (STRC)- a formal deﬁnition
A TRC which has no security restriction will respond to every stimulus received by it. The
introduction of security properties at the frame of a TRC will enrich its behavior by forcing
(1) an analysis of the stimulus received before processing it internally, and (2) an analysis
of the response before sending it. In order to enforce security analysis at the interfaces of
a component, we use a security mechanism that uniﬁes both access control and interface
security models. Access control models restrict access to component services, and validates
user requests of authorized users. We apply this restriction at the interfaces of components.
The security mechanism deﬁnes: (1) user identities, (2) access control matrices, and (3)
security access functions. First, in computer security [6] the identity of the entity executing
a process is the basis for assigning and checking security access rights. We assume a
list of all possible identities deﬁned at the system level. In our discussion, the user identity,
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henceforth called user, is associated with the component at its instantiation time. All access
control to system resources assume that the association is correct. Verifying the correctness
of the identity and describing how it is associated to components falls outside the scope of
this paper. Second, Ensuring security requires an explicit deﬁnition of an access control
matrices that deﬁne the access level of users to both services (events) and information
associated with services. Third, security access functions are used to check if the user of
the component is authorized to request a service (send a stimulus) and/or receive a service
(response) from the TRC. Also, it checks if the user is authorized to view the information
carried by the response. If the user is denied access, the stimulus will be ignored. Also, if
the user is not authorized to view a data parameter, the parameter will be ﬁltered. Based on
the stated security mechanism, the security property of a TRC can be deﬁned in terms of
event-security and data-security.
Deﬁnition 3.9 An interface of a TRC is event-secure if (1) every stimulus event is received
from a user who is authorized to trigger the stimulus, and (2) for every response event sent,
the user receiving the response is authorized to view the response. An interface of a TRC is
data-secure if (1) the TRC user has access rights for the data parameters in every stimulus
sent by the user, and (2) for every response sent by the TRC, the user receiving the response
has access rights for the data parameters in the response.
Deﬁnition 3.10 A sequence of events at a component interface is secure if and only if it is
event-secure and data-secure. A TRC is secure if and only if all event sequences at all its
interfaces are secure.
The frame speciﬁcation of a STRC is deﬁned by extending the frame speciﬁcation of
the TRC with security speciﬁcations. We assume that U denotes the set of users. For the
sake of simplicity we assume AC = {grant,deny} is the set of access rights for events,
and DA = {read,write} is the set of allowed actions on data.
Deﬁnition 3.11 The frame speciﬁcation CTF of a STRC is obtained by extending the tu-
ple < Π,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ,Θ,Γ,Ω > with functions Υ,Ψ, where Υ : U × Σ → AC is the
event-security access function that assigns for every pair (user,event) an authorization
which is either grant or deny, and Ψ : U × Λ → P DA is a data-security access func-
tion that assigns for every pair (user,data) an authorization which is a subset of DA.
If Ψ(u,d) = ∅ user u is denied access to data d. A STRC component is thus the tuple
< Π,Σ,Λ,Ξ,σ,Θ,Γ,Ω,Υ,Ψ >.
In a STRC, we require the behavior S(p) at every interface p of CF to satisfy the
following conditions (security requirements): for every sequence ω ∈ S(p), for every
stimulus s in ω, s ∈ σ(p) let u denote the user associated with the component injecting
s, let u′ denotes the user associated with the component which will receive the response,
u,u′ ∈ U:
• [C1] Υ(u,s) = grant and Υ(u′,Θ(s)) = grant, and
• [C2] for every data parameter d ∈ Ξ(s) and d′ ∈ Ξ(Θ(s)), Ψ(u,d) = {read,write}
and Ψ(u′,d′) = {read}.
Deﬁnition 3.12 A trustworthy component (TTRC) is a STRC whose behavior satisﬁes the
conditions [S1],[S2],[S3],[S4],[C1],[C2].
10Alagar and Mohammad
3.5 Speciﬁcation of security properties
In the literature, safety and security properties are formally speciﬁed and veriﬁed using dif-
ferent methods. This is due to the common consensus that while safety properties are
deﬁned as sets of “safe” sequences, security properties cannot be expressed as sets of
sequences[18,27,16]. It is known [1] that safety properties can be preserved in a com-
position, however some security properties are not preserved by any composition [17].
This implies that different formal methods have to be used for the speciﬁcation and veri-
ﬁcation of security independent of safety. We argue that event-security and data-security
properties suggested by this paper can be expressed as sets of sequences. Hence, these
security properties can be expressed in any mathematical logic in which safety properties
are expressed. Therefore, a uniﬁed method can be used for the formal speciﬁcation and
veriﬁcation of safety and security requirements.
Deﬁnition 3.13 Let S(p) be the set of sequences occurring at an interface p of CF.
Each sequence ω ∈ S(p) consists of stimuli and responses satisfying the conditions
S[1],S[2],S[3],S[4] in Deﬁnition 3.7. Let #ω denote the number of events in a sequence
ω, e[i] denote the event at the index i of sequence ω, u denote the identity of the user in-
jecting the stimulus e[i], Θ(e[i]) denote the response of e[i], and u′ denote the identity of
the user who will receive the response. The event security property at the interface p is
∀ω ∈ S,1 ≤ i ≤ #ω • (Υ(u,e[i]) = grant) ∧ (Υ(u′,Θ(e[i])) = grant)
The data security property at the interface p is
∀ω ∈ S,1 ≤ i ≤ #ω • ∀d ∈ Ξ(e[i]),∀d′ ∈ Ξ(Θ(e[i])) • (Ψ(u,d) = {read,write})
∧(Ψ(u′,d′) = {read})
4 Composition of Trustworthy Components
Informally, composition means “gluing together” two or more components to form a new
component. A given set of components can be composed in different ways to achieve
different results. However, the challenging aspect is to develop a set of rules for a stated
requirements of trustworthiness to be preserved in a composition. It should be possible
to reason about the properties of the composite component relative to the properties of
the constituent components. In this respect composition of components is different from
component integration [10].
In this section we propose a composition rule that composes both the structure part
and the contract part of components. For example, composing two components C1 and C2
results in a new composite components C such that: (1) the structure part of C results from
gluing the compatible interfaces of C1 and C2, and (2) the contract part of C results from
composing the contracts of C1 and C2. For the composition to be trustworthy, it should
preserve the requirements of trustworthiness ([S1],[S2],[S3],[S4],[C1],[C2]).
4.1 Composition of TTRCs
In this section we deﬁne the composition of templates CT1 and CT2.
11Alagar and Mohammad
Deﬁnition 4.1 Let CT1F =< Π1,Σ1,Λ1,Ξ1,σ1,Θ1,Γ1,Ω1,Υ1,Ψ1 > and CT2F =<
Π2,Σ2,Λ2,Ξ2,σ2,Θ2,Γ2,Ω2,Υ2,Ψ2 >, their corresponding architectures CT1A and
CT2A are hidden. The composition rule deﬁnes a unique CTF which can have many archi-
tectures CTA. The composition CTF =< Π,Σ,D,Ξ,σ,Θ,Γ,Ω,Υ,Ψ > is given below:
Π = {P|(P ∈ Π1 ∧ ∄Q ∈ Π2 • Compatible(P,Q)) ∨ (P ∈ Π2 ∧ ∄Q ∈ Π1 •
Compatible(P,Q))}
Σ = Σ1 ∪ Σ2
Λ = Λ1 ∪ Λ2
∀e ∈ Σ, Ξ(e) = {Ξ1(e) | e ∈ Σ1} ∪ {Ξ2(e) | e ∈ Σ2}
∀P ∈ Π, σ(P) = {σ1(P) | P ∈ Π1} ∪ {σ2(P) | P ∈ Π2}
∀e ∈ Σ, Θ(e) = {Θ1(e) | e ∈ Σ1} ∪ {Θ2(e) | e ∈ Σ2}
Γ = Γ1∪Γ2. Notice that we want to retain the constraints at the interfaces that are no more
‘visible’ in order that we can reason about grey-box behavior.
Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2
∀e ∈ Σ, ∀u ∈ U,Υ(u,e) =

    
    
grant, if e ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2 ∧ Υ1(u,e) = Υ2(u,e) = grant;
deny, if e ∈ Σ1 ∩ Σ2 ∧ Υ1(u,e) = deny ∨ Υ2(u,e) = deny;
Υ1(u,e), if e ∈ Σ1 ∧ e / ∈ Σ2;
Υ2(u,e), if e ∈ Σ2 ∧ e / ∈ Σ1
∀e ∈ Σ, ∀d ∈ Ξ(e), ∀u ∈ U,Ψ(u,d) =

 
 
Ψ1(u,d) ∩ Ψ2(u,d), if d ∈ Λ1 ∩ Λ2;
Ψ1(u,d), if d ∈ Λ1 ∧ d / ∈ Λ2;
Ψ2(u,d), if d ∈ Λ2 ∧ d / ∈ Λ1
∀P ∈ Π1, ∀Q ∈ Π2, if Compatible(P,Q) then there exists a connector type P @ CT1F ⊞
Q @ CT2F in CT. There could be many architecture types for CTF because not all the
interfaces in the resulting connector types should be linked. Also, different component
instances can have a different number of connector and interface instances which enables
the component to have different possible dynamic architectures.
We assert that the composition rule stated in Deﬁnition 4.1 preserves the requirements of
safety and security ([S1],[S2],[S3],[S4],[C1],[C2]).
Theorem 4.2 The composition of two TTRCs results in a TTRC.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
5 Related Work
We compare our model with the state of the art component model SOFA 2.0 [7,14,8]. A
comparison between SOFA 2.0 and the other component models can be found in [13].
SOFA 2.0 is a hierarchical component model that inherits structure from its ancestor
SOFA [21]. The main features of SOFA 2.0 include: (1) a meta-model based design of
components, (2) support for dynamic reconﬁguration of architectures using predeﬁned pat-
terns that allow adding/removing components and connecting to external services, (3) sup-
port for different communication styles by deﬁning connectors as ﬁrst class components,
(4) deﬁning the control part of components using micro-components, and (5) providing
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design time and runtime environments for the development and deployment of component
based systems. In this paper, we compare the relevant formal and structural aspects of our
model with their correspondents in SOFA 2.0. Our work differs from SOFA 2.0 fundamen-
tally in that our model is supporting RTRS. The introduction of time brings sophistication
to system design and composition. Also, our model provides formal foundation for the
speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of safety and security properties [2] which is not supported
by SOFA 2.0. Furthermore, in SOFA, the frame is deﬁned as an aggregation of interfaces,
whereas in our model the frame is an aggregation of interface types. Also, the architecture
of composite components in SOFAdeﬁnes connectors while in our model it deﬁnes connec-
tor types. This allows, in our model, a dynamic conﬁguration of the component’s black-box
and internal structure at deployment time beneﬁting from the available information. This
is because it is possible, in our model, to create multiple instances of each interface type
and instantiate connectors to each of them at the time of instantiating an architecture from
the design time architecture type selected for a frame. However, SOFA 2.0 deﬁnes a static
deployment model and allows reconﬁguration later. The reconﬁguration of components in
SOFA 2.0 is not suitable for trustworthy RTRS because (1) removing components affects
the availability of services which violates an important requirement of RTRS, (2) adding
new components may introduce new security threats. In SOFA 2.0, connectors deﬁne end
points that can be connected to any interface; however, in our model we specify interface
types in the link of the connector type. This enables us to enforce and check compatibility
between connected interfaces.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented one part of our ongoing research work on a formal ap-
proach to component modeling for the development of trustworthy RTRS. We have pre-
sented a formal foundation for deﬁning and composing hierarchical structure and contract
for trustworty components. We pointed out that safety and security are the two essen-
tial credentials that can assure high degree of trustworthiness. We have shown that using
CBD it is possible to formally specify trustworthy components and compose them. This
approach leads us to a uniﬁed method for the veriﬁcation of trust using model checking,
which has been shown to be a promising method for the veriﬁcation of safety properties
for RTRS. Currently, we are working on the automatic generation of the behavior protocol
for trustworthy components from its structure and contract views. We are investigating a
model checking approach that ﬁrst translates the component model to UPPAAL language
and uses the model checker in UPPAAL toolset to verify trustworthiness credentials [2].
7 Appendix
In this section we provide proof for Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Let C1 and C2, instances of CT1 and CT2 respectively, be two trustworthy compo-
nents. Their behavior satisfy the properties [S1],[S2],[S3],[S4],[C1], and [C2]. Let C be
an instance of CTF, the composition of CT1F and CT2F according to Deﬁnition 4.1. Let
S1 and S2 be behaviors representing the set of all possible observed sequences of C1 and
C2 respectively, S be the behavior of the composite component C representing the set of
all possible observed sequences of C, S(p) be the behavior at an interface p instantiated
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from interface type P ∈ Π in CF. The proof procedure consists of 3 steps: (I) a proof that
the behavior of C satisﬁes the properties [S1],[S2],[S3], and [S4], (II) a proof that if C1
satisﬁes safety property τ1 and C2 satisﬁes safety property τ2 then C satisﬁes both τ1 and
τ2 i.e. the composition preserves safety properties, and (III) a proof that the behavior of C
satisﬁes [C1] and [C2] i.e. the composition preserves event security and data security.
We use the following properties in the proof. (Prop.1) From Deﬁnition 3.1 every event
is associated with only one interface type: ∀P,Q ∈ Π,σ(P) ∩ σ(q) = ∅, (Prop.2) from
Deﬁnition 3.2 every interface type in the composite frame belongs only to one frame def-
inition CT1F or CT2F: ∀P ∈ Π • (P ∈ Π1 ∨ P ∈ Π2) ∧ (P / ∈ Π1 ∩ Π2), (Prop.3) from
Deﬁnition 3.1 there are no two interface types that are compatible in the composite frame
deﬁnition CF: ∄Q ∈ Π,Compatible(P,Q).
Preserving properties [S1],[S2],[S3], and [S4]: from Deﬁnition 3.8, S is constructed
from the arbitrary interleaving of the behaviors at the interfaces of CF. From Prop.2, every
interface p in CF is either an interface at C1F or at C2F. Since the behaviors S1(p) or S2(p)
for every interface p in C1 and C2 satisﬁes [S1],[S2],[S3], and [S4] then the behavior S(p)
of every interface p at CF satisﬁes those properties.
Preserving Safety: Let τ1 and τ2 be two safety properties, R1 and R2 be the set of
all sequences which satisfy τ1 and τ2 respectively. That is, sequences of C1 satisfy τ1 and
sequences of C2 satisfy τ2. Therefore, S1 ⊆ R1 ∧ S2 ⊆ R2. From Prop.1, Prop.2, and
Prop.3 we have ∀p : P, P ∈ Π, ∀ω ∈ S(p),ω ∈ S1(p) ∨ ω ∈ S2(p). This means that
∀ω ∈ S(p), ω ∈ R1 ∨ω ∈ R2. Hence, ∀ω ∈ S(p), ω ∈ R1 ∪R2. Thus, S(p) ⊆ R1 ∪R2.
Therefore, S ⊆ R1 ∪ R2, the composition satisﬁes both τ1 and τ2. This shows that the
composition preserves safety properties.
Preserving event security [C1]: Let ω ∈ S, u,u′ ∈ U be users and u[i],u′[i] de-
note the user stimulating the event at index i of ω and the user receiving the response
respectively. From Prop.1, Prop.2, and Prop.3: ∀P ∈ Π,∀e ∈ σ(P),(e ∈ Σ1 ∨ e ∈
Σ2) ∧ (e / ∈ Σ1 ∪ Σ2). Therefore,∀ω ∈ S,∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω • (Υ(u[i],e[i]) =
Υ1(e,u),Υ(u[i]′,Θ(e[i])) = Υ1(u[i]′,Θ(e[i])) ∧ e ∈ Σ1) ∨ (Υ(u[i],e[i]) =
Υ2(u[i],e[i]),Υ(u[i]′,Θ(e[i])) = Υ2(u[i]′,Θ(e[i])) ∧ e ∈ Σ2). Since ∀ω1 ∈ S1, ∀i ∈
N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω1 • Υ1(e[i],u[i]) = grant ∧ Υ1(u′[i],Θ(e[i])) = grant and ∀ω2 ∈
S2, ∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω2 • Υ2(e[i],u[i]) = grant ∧ Υ2(u′[i],Θ(e[i])) = grant.
Thus,∀ω ∈ S, ∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω • Υ(e[i],u[i]) = grant ∧ Υ(u′[i],Θ(e[i])) = grant.
Therefore, the composition preserves the event-security property.
Preserving data security [C2]: From Prop.1, Prop.2, and Prop.3: ∀P ∈ Π, ∀e ∈
σ(P), (Ξ(e) ⊆ Λ1,Ξ(Θ(e)) ⊆ Λ1 ∨ Ξ(e) ⊆ Λ2,Ξ(Θ(e)) ⊆ Λ2) ∧ (∀d ∈ Ξ(e),∀d′ ∈
Ξ(Θ(e)) • d,d′ / ∈ Λ1 ∩ Λ2). Thus, ∀ω ∈ S,∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω,∀d ∈
Ξ(e[i]),∀d′ ∈ Ξ(Θ(e[i])) • ( Ψ(u[i],d) = Ψ1(u,d),Ψ(u′[i],d′) = Ψ1(u′[i],d′) ∧ e ∈
Σ1 ) ∨ ( Ψ(u[i],d) = Ψ2(u[i],d),Ψ(u[i]′,d′) = Ψ2(u′[i],d′) ∧ e ∈ Σ2 ). Since
∀ω1 ∈ S1, ∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω1,∀d ∈ Ξ(e[i]),∀d′ ∈ Ξ(Θ(e[i])) • Ψ1(u[i],d) =
{read,write} ∧ Ψ1(u′[i],d′) = {read} and ∀ω2 ∈ S2, ∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤ #ω2 •
Ψ2(u[i],d) = {read,write} ∧ Ψ2(u′[i],d′) = {read}. Hence,∀ω ∈ S, ∀i ∈ N • 1 ≤ i ≤
#ω • Ψ(u[i],d) = {read,write} ∧ Ψ(u′[i],d′) = {read}. Therefore, the composition
preserves the data security property. 2
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